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Abstract 
My aim in this paper is to give a philosophical analysis of the relationship between contingently available technology 
and the knowledge that it makes possible. My concern is with what specific subjects can know in practice, given their 
particular conditions, especially available technology, rather than what can be known “in principle” by a hypothetical 
entity like Laplace’s Demon. The argument has two parts. In the first, I’ll construct a novel account of epistemic 
possibility that incorporates two pragmatic conditions: responsibility and practicability. For example, whether subjects 
can gain knowledge depends in some circumstances on whether they have the capability of gathering relevant evidence. 
In turn, the possibility of undertaking such investigative activities depends in part on factors like ethical constraints, 
economical realities, and available technology. In the second part of the paper, I’ll introduce “technological possibility” 
to analyze the set of actions made possible by available technology. To help motivate the problem and later test my 
proposal, I’ll focus on a specific historical case, one of the earliest uses of digital electronic computers in a scientific 
investigation. I conclude that the epistemic possibility of gaining access to scientific knowledge about certain subjects 
depends (in some cases) on the technological possibility for making responsible investigations. 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
Let me begin with a historiographical debate about how to understand the earliest uses of digital electronic computers in 
scientific investigations. Peter Galison argues for the necessity of the digital electronic computer to certain advances in 
scientific knowledge during the Manhattan Project. “Some kind of numerical modelling was necessary, and here nothing 
could replace the prototype computer just coming into operation in late 1945: the ENIAC” (Galison 1996, 122). 
Galison’s claim is that a technological change made it possible for scientific knowledge to develop. John Agar argues 
against the necessity of that technological change for the advancement of knowledge: other approaches could have 
sufficed. “Computerization was usually first proposed when the existing practices and technologies were still capable of 
the computational task at hand” (Agar 2006, 873). Implicit in these statements are crucial assumptions about the 
relationship between technology and knowledge. Galison and Agar agree that certain scientific knowledge became 
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accessible to Manhattan Project scientists once they began to run “Monte Carlo” calculations, named after the famous 
gambling establishment because of the method’s use of random numbers. They disagree about which changes in the 
situation of the scientists made those investigations possible. Galison thinks access to digital electronic computers made 
the difference. Agar thinks that the Monte Carlo method could have been implemented using existing computational 
approaches. 
Both analyses turn on what was possible under the circumstances rather than on what actually transpired. The conflict 
between Galison’s and Agar’s claims about the digital electronic computer arises because they invoke different implicit 
notions of what was possible. The commonsense notion of possibility is just what might happen, what might exist, or 
what might be true. But in practice, we freely constrain these generic notions of possibility to reflect narrower concerns. 
For example, suppose I claim that driving the wrong way down a one-way street is impossible. The truth of that claim 
turns on the kind of possibility we invoke in evaluating it. Driving the wrong way down a one-way street is physically 
possible, because the laws of physics do not forbid it (making my claim false on this analysis). Alternatively, because a 
municipal law does forbid it, it is regulatively impossible (making my claim true). Similarly, my traveling to the nearby 
star Alpha Centauri by 2020 is (let’s say) theoretically and physically possible, but simultaneously technologically and 
economically impossible. To return to the case at hand, Agar is saying, roughly, that digital electronic computers were 
not necessary for completing the needed work; Galison, that they were. What is at stake in this disagreement is an 
understanding of the role that a particular piece of technology played in the practice of science at a particular time. 
According to Galison, the digital electronic computer brought certain propositions into the realm of scientific 
knowledge—that is, they changed what was technologically possible (allowing the Monte Carlo method to be put into 
practice), and consequently what was epistemically possible for the scientists. Contrariwise, Agar thinks this way of 
putting things gives too much credit to the material means of accomplishing a task. Instead, a conceptual means (the 
Monte Carlo method) made those advancements possible—and could have done so without being implemented on a 
digital electronic computer. 
In order to understand and evaluate Galison’s and Agar’s claims about the difference technology makes to knowledge, 
we need an account that explicitly recognizes that technological changes make it possible for individuals to undertake 
different actions, and some of these actions make it possible for those individuals to gain different knowledge. The rest 
of this paper is devoted to this task, and the paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, concerning the relationship 
between possible actions and possible knowledge, I’ll argue that we need an account of epistemic possibility that 
captures the dependency of knowledge on being able to take the appropriate action. It is, I think, uncontroversial to say 
that being able to complete certain actions can be a necessary condition for gaining knowledge. In scientific practice, for 
example, gaining knowledge depends on having relevant evidence, which makes being able to gather the evidence a 
condition for gaining the knowledge. My contibution is to argue that because a scientist is (under certain conditions) 
expected to seek evidence before making a knowledge claim within her domain of expertise, we need to build this 
expectation into our account of knowledge—and because expectations are not always fulfilled, the appropriate 
philosophical concept is epistemic possibility. 
 3 
In the second part of the paper, I turn to the relationship between technology and possible actions. A number of practical 
factors affect our ability to act, including economics and ethics, but I will focus on technology, touching on the others 
only incidentally. I’ll introduce an analysis of technological possibility, which depends on the availability of material and 
conceptual means to bring about a desired state of affairs, and argue that the epistemic possibility of gaining access to 
scientific knowledge depends (in some cases) on the technological possibility for carrying out certain investigations. In 
such cases, technological possibility can be seen as a necessary condition for epistemic possibility. Finally, I will return 
to the disagreement between Galison and Agar and show how my analysis of epistemic and technological possibility 
resolves the conflict. 
Part	  1.	  Doing	  and	  Knowing	  
My overarching aim in this paper is to give an account of the relationship between contingently available technology and 
the knowledge that it puts within ‘epistemic reach,’ to use Egan’s vivid phrase (2007, 8). The relevant philosophical 
concept here is epistemic possibility, which is meant to reflect epistemic reach by distinguishing between what a subject 
can and cannot know given her epistemic circumstances. The Agar-Galison example illustrates that some knowledge 
claims require the gathering of evidence, which suggests an understanding of epistemic reach that is responsive to the 
actions a subject can actually accomplish. Canonical accounts of epistemic possibility tend to be insensitive to this issue, 
as I will show. I will develop a novel account of epistemic possibility that takes into consideration practical conditions 
for knowing, taking particular care to develop my account in such a way that it can accommodate epistemic 
responsibilities such as the evidence-seeking duties scientists adopt when they aim to produce scientific knowledge. As I 
will argue, this requires a definition of epistemic possibility that includes both a practicability criterion and a 
responsibility criterion. My approach will be to begin with a canonical definition of epistemic possibility1 and then 
elaborate it. 
The usual starting point for epistemic possibility is that it should somehow reflect a subject’s epistemic position. Thus, 
for a subject S to claim that the proposition Φ is epistemically possible is for S to say that Φ is possible relative to S’s 
epistemic position. Taking “S’s epistemic position” to be, in the simplest case, “what S knows,” leads straightforwardly 
to the canonical definition of epistemic possibility (Hacking [1967], Teller [1972], DeRose [1991] and the individual 
contributors to Gendler and Hawthorne [2002] and Egan and Weatherson [2011] all take this as their point of departure): 
                                                
1 The main thread of philosophical accounts of epistemic possibility traces at least to Moore (1962), and the topic has 
enjoyed a recent flourishing (see, e.g., the collected volume by Egan and Weatherson [2011]). According to the 
canonical account, when a subject says that something is possible, we should understand this claim as being made 
relative to a person, a group, or a set of information. But precisely which person, group, or set of information? Egan and 
Weatherson (2011) identify three clusters of answers: contextualists think the context of utterance somehow specifies an 
answer (see DeRose 1991; von Fintel and Gillies 2011), relativists look to the context of assessment (see Egan et al. 
2005; MacFarlane 2011), and expressivists think modal statements express the speaker’s mental state of uncertainty (see 
Yalcin 2011). The discussion in this paper centers on the canonical contextualist accounts, though I will make note of 
some divergent views. 
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(a) Φ is epistemically possible for S if S doesn’t know –Φ. 
The idea is that if S doesn’t know for certain that Φ is not the case, then S must consider Φ to be possible. For example, 
if S knows Φ, then S cannot know –Φ, and Φ is epistemically possible. On the other hand, if S knows –Φ, then Φ is by 
definition epistemically impossible. Finally, if S knows neither Φ nor –Φ, then Φ is epistemically possible for S (as is –
Φ). More concretely, if I have just checked my key hook for my lost keys (and failed to locate them there), then for me, it 
is not epistemically possible for my keys to be on the key hook. But if I have not yet looked on the table, then it is 
epistemically possible for my keys to be there, assuming I have no other reasons for excluding that possibility. 
Note that, on most accounts, epistemic possibility is sensitive to what S could know given S’s epistemic position rather 
than reflecting what S actually believes.2 Suppose S deems Φ possible, forgetting to take into account that –Φ. In such a 
case, S is wrong; S should know better than to think Φ is possible. That is, Φ is in fact not epistemically possible for S, 
even if S thinks that Φ is possible. In such cases, epistemic possibility provides grounds to blame S for a misjudgment. 
As it turns out, taking S’s epistemic position to mean “what S knows” leads almost immediately to results that confound 
the intuitions of some philosophers. (a) presumes that the only factor relevant to S’s epistemic position is what S knows 
at the time, a condition that fails to hold for any proposition S hasn’t considered before (at least for any view of 
knowledge that includes “belief” as a necessary condition). Suppose Φ is the proposition that “4+3=9,” something S 
would reject upon even a moment’s consideration. Nevertheless, if S has never considered whether “4+3=9,” then, 
according to (a), “4+3=9” is epistemically possible for S, because S has no beliefs about it whatever. On this view, if S 
blurts that “Perhaps ‘4+3=9’” without pausing to consider it, we have no cause to say S is wrong, for “4+3=9” really is 
epistemically possible for S. Yet if S should later consider whether “4+3=9,” S would immediately judge it to be 
impossible, and could then be blamed for saying that “4+3=9” is possible (for further discussion of cases like this, see 
Huemer [2007] and Yalcin [2011]). 
If the goal of epistemic possibility is to reflect S’s epistemic position, it seems like a strange consequence that we can 
blame S for failing to recall Φ, but not for failing to consider it. Several accounts of epistemic possibility attempt to close 
the gap between failing to recall and failing to consider by expanding “epistemic position” to include everything “within 
epistemic reach,” yet as we will see, it has been difficult to specify just what counts as being within epistemic reach.  
If (a) fails to capture what is within epistemic reach, perhaps we can simply add such a description to the original 
definition. For example, we might say that: 
(b) Φ is epistemically possible for S if S does not know that –Φ, nor would careful 
reflection establish that –Φ. 
                                                
2 Expressivists would presumably disagree. For expressivists, epistemic possibilities express a subject’s uncertainty 
rather than describing a relationship between the subject’s knowledge (or information) and the state of the world (see, 
e.g. Yalcin 2011). I must set this view aside in this paper. 
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Here, S isn’t allowed to simply blurt out that “perhaps ‘4+3=9.’” She must first carefully reflect upon the proposition. 
This eliminates the problem of unconsidered cases like “4+3=9,” while still being limited to the knowledge S has (plus 
inferences from that knowledge). Unfortunately, “careful reflection” is too vague a requirement to capture what is 
practicably within a subject’s epistemic reach, which means that definition (b) fails to appropriately reflect what S is in a 
position to know in practice. For example, Goldbach’s conjecture states that every even integer greater than two can be 
written as the sum of two primes. It hasn’t been proved or disproved, but the axioms of mathematics are such that 
Goldbach’s conjecture, if true, is true necessarily, and if false, is false necessarily. Mathematicians don’t yet know its 
truth-value, and many hours of careful reflection have not resolved the situation. Nevertheless, some amount of 
additional reflection might solve it, as has transpired for many other mathematical conjectures. The point is that “careful 
reflection” doesn’t distinguish between five minutes, five hours, or five years of reflection. (Stanley’s [2005] suggestion 
that S take into account “obvious entailments” of what S knows seems to me to do a little better than (b), but it fails to 
respond to Hacking’s criticism of (c), below.) But is (b) merely too vague in describing epistemic reach, or are we on the 
wrong track altogether? 
I propose to expand the notion of epistemic reach to include practicable responsibilities. Careful reflection remains a 
plausible starting point, though to be complete we would need to say how much reflection a subject is responsible to 
perform, and how much reflection is practicable. After considering some other proposals, I will argue that the limits of 
practicable responsibility are determined by context. But before continuing, let me make the case for responsibility, since 
this suggestion will strike some as tendentious. 
Richard Foley suggests that “our everyday evaluations tend to be concerned with whether one has been responsible in 
arriving at one’s beliefs” (2003, 9). Let me give two examples of responsibly arriving at one’s beliefs. First, in the 
context of scientific knowledge claims, we routinely expect these claims to carry special weight in light of experimental 
evidence or theoretical justification. Accordingly, we impose special responsibilities, sometimes called epistemic duties, 
on scientists (see, e.g., Kornblith [1983]). Lest we conclude that role responsibilities are a special case, I point out that 
epistemic duties appear in everyday cases too. When I call my office to ask a colleague whether a letter I am expecting 
has arrived, I won’t be satisfied with the claim that it is “possible” that the letter has arrived—I want to know one way or 
the other! I want my colleague to check the incoming mail. But reasonable expectations have limits: I won’t blame my 
colleague for not noticing that the letter has slipped behind a desk or was delivered to the wrong recipient. The point is 
that epistemic possibility should not only reflect what knowledge S already has, but should also take into consideration 
S’s responsibilities to gather additional evidence. On the epistemic responsibilities view, S should not always settle for 
the evidence she has in hand, but must in at least some cases conduct an inquiry or seek new evidence before making a 
knowledge claim. These facts are a part of a subject’s epistemic circumstances, and so should be reflected in our analysis 
of epistemic possibility. 
While the idea behind epistemic responsibilities—that sometimes we must back up our claims—is fairly straightforward, 
the existence and nature of epistemic responsibilities are controversial in epistemology. I should mention that an 
alternative to the epistemic responsibility view states that although we do sometimes have the duty of seeking new 
evidence, that duty should be understood as being moral, not epistemic (see, e.g., Conee and Feldman [2004]). My 
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account is compatible with either view, but I shall use the term “epistemic responsibility” to indicate any duty that is a 
condition for making a knowledge claim (indeed, I shall use the term whether or not the duty promotes genuine 
knowledge). I will also set aside the larger question of whether we always have epistemic responsibilities, and instead 
distinguish between weak epistemic possibility, which does not include responsibilities, and strong epistemic possibility, 
which does include responsibilities. For the remainder of the paper, when I refer to “epistemic possibility” I mean strong 
epistemic possibility. 
Because responsibility is a novel contribution to the discussion of epistemic possibility, let me briefly describe some 
features of what I take to be a plausible account of epistemic responsibility. I won’t defend such a view here; rather, I 
merely want to show that some account might be made to work with my version of epistemic possibility.  First, context-
relevant risks may be distinguished from background-level risks. Second, epistemic responsibilities need respond only to 
context-relevant risks. And third, background risks may be converted into context-relevant risks (and vice-versa) through 
negotiation. 
There is a distinction to be maintained between the question of when Φ is justified and when S has warrant to claim Φ 
(see, e.g., Williams 2001). Epistemic responsibilities, as I use the term here, have to do with claiming. S’s making a 
claim about Φ invokes a responsibility, but fulfilling this responsibility does not guarantee that a claim is justified. What 
determines epistemic responsibility is not the actual epistemic risk of a particular claim, but its perceived (context-
relevant) risk relative to a particular set of background commitments that S need not defend. The focus on context-
relevant risks allows us to bracket the epistemic risks associated with the background commitments in order to stay 
focused on foreground issues. To give an extreme example, in deciding whether to accept a stranger’s testimony about 
the local bus schedule, we tend to disregard the possibility that the external world is an illusion. The idea is not to ignore 
those background-level risks, but merely to focus on the risks associated with a particular claim within the relevant 
context. Focusing on the contextual claim has the effect of “normalizing” or rescaling its risks against a chosen 
background. Background risks don’t disappear; they are simply shifted away from center stage. 
Background risks can be accommodated in a number of ways. We can demand that they be traced (or be traceable) to 
basic beliefs (as in foundationalist accounts of knowledge); we can reduce them to mere stipulations (as in some 
relativist accounts); or (as I prefer) we can recognize that what counts as background is negotiable. As Helen Longino 
puts it (with respect to propositional scientific knowledge), “as long as background beliefs can be articulated and 
subjected to criticism from the scientific community, they can be defended, modified, or abandoned in response to such 
criticism” (Longino 1990, 73-74). The effect of putting background on the bargaining table is to create a sort of “division 
of labor” for epistemic risks. Even if some risks are unaddressed or unknown at a given time, they can be articulated and 
worried over at a later date (and dependent foreground risks can be recalibrated accordingly). This negotiation model 
seems to fit the way that science works, at least some of the time. For example, in order to conduct detailed research, a 
scientist interested in molecular physics takes on board the risk of being wrong about causality, mass-energy 
conservation laws, statistical laws, and so on. But setting those risks aside doesn’t mean accepting them unquestioningly; 
scientists decide which risks they need to address before making a claim, and other scientists decide whether the 
appropriate risks have been addressed before accepting the claim.  
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Part of what is being negotiated is who is responsible for addressing particular epistemic risks. Responsibilities may be 
stronger, weaker, or even unrelated to the justification standards for knowledge. Ideally, S’s fulfilling the epistemic 
duties for being able to claim Φ would be necessary and sufficient to justify Φ. But suppose that there is a mismatch, and 
fulfilling responsibilities is insufficient to justify Φ. Nevertheless, fulfilling responsibilities is still necessary for having 
knowledge of Φ, because any claim that fails to fulfill responsibilities is a non-starter in the context in which it is made. 
That is, fulfilling responsibilities is a necessary but insufficient condition for Φ being strongly epistemically possible for 
S. It would be nice if we knew which responsibilities are relevant to justification, but we simply cannot be certain. 
Inquiry in fields like science works on the basis of their internal standards, which sometimes produce genuine knowledge 
and sometimes not. But in order for a claim to be eligible for consideration, the claimant has to fulfill the relevant 
epistemic responsibilities.  
Whether or not the preceding sketch of how epistemic responsibilities are generated is exactly right in its details, I think 
it is plausible that subjects often have a responsibility to go beyond their present beliefs, such responsibilities depend on 
a subject’s knowledge context, and these responsibilities are relevant to evaluating what is epistemically possible for 
them. I will refer to this as the “responsibility criterion” for epistemic possibility. The question is how to incorporate 
responsibility into the definition of epistemic possibility. 
One plausible solution is to include S’s epistemic community in the definition, since this group negotiates the boundaries 
of context-relevant responsibilities. It turns out that, for other reasons, the inclusion of community is a common proposal 
among contextualists as well, so there is a robust literature to work from. For those accounts, the usual idea is that if our 
concern is that (a) and (b) don’t adequately reflect what is in epistemic reach of the subject S, we must make epistemic 
possibility sensitive to the knowledge or information available to the entire group to which S makes her claim. To put it 
another way, the knowledge of everyone in the group is within the epistemic grasp of any member: she need merely ask. 
(c) Φ is epistemically possible for S if S does not know that –Φ, nor does any 
member of C, where C is S’s epistemic community. 
The advantage to this definition is that it smoothes out some of the peculiarities of S’s particular thought processes, while 
remaining true to human limitations. Even if S hasn’t considered whether Φ, perhaps someone else in C (however we 
wish to define the community) has ruled it out. The aim is not to require that S know everything known to everyone else 
in S’s community, but rather to hold S responsible for judgments that clash with what is known to someone else in the 
community.3 Variations on (c) abound. Indeed, von Fintel and Gillies identify as “canon” the view that “epistemic 
modals quantify over the information available to a contextually relevant group. The context decides the group (and 
perhaps the standards by which they know)” (2011, 108). In a scientific community, this definition works rather well in 
principle, because knowledge is (ideally) made available to the entire community by mechanisms such as conferences 
                                                
3 Exactly how to define the relevant community is a matter of earnest debate. The basic premise of relativist accounts of 
epistemic possibility is that contextualist accounts cannot readily handle cases of agreement, disagreement, 
eavesdropping, or temporally dislocated responses to purported possibility claims. See Egan (2007) and MacFarlane 
(2011). See also von Fintel and Gillies (2011) for a review of some responses. 
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and publication. On definition (c), S can be deemed wrong on the basis of failing to take into account results published 
by other scientists. Unfortunately, this elaborated version of epistemic possibility has difficulties of its own, as Ian 
Hacking shows. 
Imagine a salvage crew searching for a ship that sank a long time ago. The mate of 
the salvage ship works from an old log, makes some mistakes in his calculations, and 
concludes that the wreck may be in a certain bay. It is possible, he says, that the hulk 
is in these waters. No one knows anything to the contrary. But in fact, as it turns out 
later, it simply was not possible for the vessel to be in that bay; more careful 
examination of the log shows that the boat must have gone down at least thirty miles 
further south. (1967, 148) 
No doubt it seemed possible that the vessel was in the bay until the ship’s mate rechecked his calculations. But was it 
really epistemically possible for him? To Hacking, it seems not, for the evidence the mate used to justify his belief that it 
is possible that the vessel is in the bay does not, in fact, support that claim. It supports the contrary claim that it is 
impossible that the vessel is in the bay. Hacking concludes that “the mate said something false when he said, ‘It is 
possible that we shall find the treasure here,’ but the falsehood did not arise from what anyone actually knew at the time” 
(1967, 148).  
Hacking is pointing out that in many cases there is an expectation that S has checked—and has done a good job—before 
making a claim about Φ. For Hacking,  
(d) Φ is epistemically possible for S if S doesn’t know –Φ nor would any practicable 
investigations by S establish that –Φ. 
Here, the idea is that we expected the mate to successfully complete certain reasonable actions before coming to his 
conclusion. Since he didn’t complete them successfully, we have grounds to blame him. Hacking’s definition allows us 
to adjudicate the Goldbach case satisfactorily: S is now only responsible to complete investigations that fall within 
practicable limits. Exactly where we draw that line is still vague, but at least we now have a principle for drawing one. I 
will refer to this as the “practicability criterion” for epistemic possibility. 
As it turns out, “practicability” alone doesn’t always line up with the sort of epistemic duties we impose on S. Paul Teller 
poses this rebuttal to Hacking’s practicability criterion: Teller’s wife is pregnant, but he doesn’t yet know the sex of his 
child. For Teller, it is epistemically possible that his child will be a boy, and at the same time epistemically possible that 
his child will be a girl, and this is despite the fact that there is a “practicable, in fact quite easy” test to establish the sex of 
Teller’s child (1972, 307). (Incidentally, according to Teller’s account, the sex test was newly available in 1972. A few 
years earlier, it would not have been practicable.) Teller is claiming that we can’t demand that he have this test 
performed before he answers whether it is possible that his child will be a boy. Put another way, practicability may be a 
necessary condition for a duty to be imposed on S, but it is not a sufficient one.  
Recall that Hacking introduced practicability to indicate what S should be expected to know, given S’s situation. He 
wants us to conclude that the ship’s mate has said something false in claiming the wreck may be in this very bay because 
the evidence he has examined should have told him otherwise. The mate made a mistake in his calculation, and it is easy 
to seize upon this and say that the mate should have known better. But the relevant contrast isn’t between what the mate 
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should have known after he examined the log and what he actually knew. It’s between what he should have known 
before checking and afterward. What do we want to demand of the ship’s mate before he has looked inside the logbook 
for the first time? At that time, the mate’s position is similar to that of our expectant father before a sex test has been 
performed on the fetus. The mate need only make calculations from the log and the father need only order the test. In 
each case, should S successfully complete some activity, knowledge of Φ can be had. The difference is not in the 
practicability of the task: the father’s task is easier, if anything. The difference, Teller surmises, is in the expectations of 
the community C of which S is a member. 
Teller therefore proposes the following emendation of the “community C” version of epistemic possibility (definition 
(c)):  
(e) Φ is epistemically possible for S if it is not the case that: 
(1) Φ is known to be false by any member of community C, 
(2) nor is there a member, T, of community C, such that if T were to know all the 
propositions known to community C, then he/she could, on the strength of his/her 
knowledge of these propositions as basis, data, or evidence, come to know that Φ is 
false. (Teller 1972, 310-11) 
The idea is to restrict epistemic possibility to what some member, T, of the community would be in a position to know if 
T had all of the relevant communal knowledge at hand. For my purposes, Teller’s formulation has a significant problem: 
it doesn’t accommodate responsibilities that would have a subject look beyond existing knowledge. Like the original 
“community” variation, it addresses only what is already known by the community (von Fintel and Gillies arrived at a 
similar point quite independently; see their [2011, 112-13 fn. 9]). 
Consider a slight variation on Hacking’s salvage ship problem. Suppose the mate’s mistaken calculation is the result of 
his having skipped a line in the log. This means that neither the mate, nor any other member of the salvage crew knows 
the relevant propositions about the location of the treasure. Yet we would still blame the mate for this mistake. Teller 
acknowledges this gap in his account, and fills it in by counting as “known to community C” facts written down in books 
available to the community (1972, 312). But responsibility to access extant knowledge isn’t quite what we’re after for 
understanding responsible knowledge in scientific contexts—we usually want scientists to go out into the world and 
check. 
Hacking’s point was that we need to establish some reasonable grounds for saying the mate is wrong. His answer was 
practicability; Teller’s is, essentially, a slightly more detailed version of the responsibility account we saw earlier in 
definition (c). My diagnosis is that both Teller and Hacking have part of the story right.4 The difficulty in defining 
epistemic possibility is in correctly balancing the practicability and responsibility criteria. This is difficult to do outside 
of specific contexts, and the solution is to avoid removing context from the analysis. That is, rather than try to define 
                                                
4 Others have attempted to amalgamate parts of Hacking’s and Teller’s accounts. DeRose’s (1991) “relevant way” and 
Egan’s (2007) “epistemic reach” are two of the better examples. Both remain quite vague about how to find out what is a 
relevant way within epistemic reach. 
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practicability or responsibility separately in some objective manner, the solution is to observe that communities negotiate 
and define practicable responsibilities for themselves based on their interests, including assessments of epistemic risk. In 
the case of scientific communities, practicable responsibilities are (partially) explicit: scientists must meet specific 
standards of evidence and justification or else withhold judgment or use qualified language. Within a given community, 
C, if an individual, S, makes a knowledge claim and meets C’s epistemic standards, E, then C will accept it. That is, 
(f) Φ is epistemically possible for S if S does not know that –Φ, nor do the epistemic 
standards E of community C demand that S carry out any practicable investigation 
that would establish that –Φ. 
Let’s see how my proposal handles the examples we’ve just seen. On my account, an expectant father can rightly say that 
it is possible his child will be a boy even if a definitive test is available, because his community (his family and friends) 
does not demand that he order the test. By contrast, the mate on the salvage crew is expected to eliminate the present bay 
from the list of possible locations for the wreck, since his community (his shipmates) demands that he glean this 
information from the log. In each case, the relevant community (the community to which S is presenting a claim) decides 
which practicable investigations S is obliged to undertake. It is the epistemic standard of the salvage crew that lets 
Hacking deem the mate wrong when he claims the wreck may be in this harbor. And it is the epistemic standard of 
family and friends that let Teller deem himself correct when he claims that his child may be a boy (even if his child were 
a girl). In sum, epistemic possibility lies at the intersection of epistemic responsbilities and practicable actions. There 
may be responsibilities that are not practicable and practicable actions that are not responsibilities.  
*	   *	   *	  
My practicable responsibilities account of epistemic possibility can also illuminate practical discussions of possibility, 
such as the one with which I began the paper. Digital electronic computers became available at a time physicists at Los 
Alamos were butting heads with a difficult and dangerous subject matter: nuclear bombs. In order for their claims to be 
accepted within their epistemic community, Manhattan Project scientists had to fulfill certain epistemic responsibilities; 
for example, they had to meet precise standards of evidence and justification in order for their work to move forward. 
Before the advent of the digital electronic computer running Monte Carlo calculations, scientists did not fulfill those 
responsibilities, and so were stuck—they could not move forward on their bomb work, because they needed knowledge 
that was unavailable to them. That is, they had epistemic responsibilities they could not discharge without specific 
knowledge about bombs, and that knowledge was unavailable because certain actions hadn’t yet been performed. Agar 
and Galison agree about all of this. But they disagree about whether the requisite actions could have been performed 
before the advent of the digital electronic computer. That is, they disagree about whether fulfilling those responsibilities 
was practicable given the specific situation Manhattan Project scientists were in.  
If Monte Carlo was practicable before the advent of digital electronic computers, then the knowledge the scientists 
sought was within their epistemic grasp—that is, it was epistemically possible. But if Monte Carlo was impracticable 
before digital computers, then the knowledge they sought was not within their grasp. What makes an activity 
practicable? According to Galison, a technology, the digital electronic computer, made practicable for Manhattan Project 
scientists the gathering of the required evidence to fulfill their epistemic responsibilities. By contrast, Agar thinks that 
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the Monte Carlo method could have been implemented using older equipment; that is, that Monte Carlo calculations 
were practicable before they were actually put into practice. The limiting factor was a lack of theoretical guidance 
without which nuclear experiments were too dangerous and expensive to be performed. The scientists’ theoretical efforts 
were stymied by intractable analytic equations. Progress slowed. Then available technology changed and progress 
resumed. But was the technological change decisive or merely coincidental? That is, did the digital electronic computer 
offer new technological possibilities that made practicable a method that, prior to the digital electronic computer, had 
been impracticable? 
Let me be clear: the relevant constraint on epistemic possibility in a case like this is whether (and when) the scientists 
could meet their epistemic responsibilities with practicable investigations. If they could do so both before and after the 
advent of digital electronic computers, then Agar is right, and computers should not be credited with making the 
investigations possible. But if the availability of the digital electronic computer is what made particular fission 
investigations practicable, then Galison is right, and computers can be credited with making the bomb work possible. 
Either way, it was actually carrying out these investigations that made crucial knowledge epistemically possible. The 
question is whether a change in technology played the deciding role. 
I turn to technological possibility and the relation between technology and action in Part 2. 
Part	  2.	  Technological	  Possibility	  
In the first part, I argued for an account of epistemic possibility that can accommodate the epistemic responsibilities that 
can require a subject to take action. At the same time, my account is sensitive to practical limits to fulfilling those 
responsibilities. A given subject cannot undertake just any investigation. She will be competent to perform only some 
investigations, and her technological, economic, and ethical circumstances will allow still fewer. Impracticable 
responsibilities put limits on what knowledge is within a subject’s epistemic grasp. Changes to situational constraints on 
practicability can change what is epistemically possible for a subject. In the present part, I focus on technological 
possibilities as a hard constraint on practicability and therefore epistemic possibility. Technological possibility depends 
on availability of the material and conceptual resources required to complete some action or produce a desired state of 
affairs. Thus: 
(g) A course of action is technologically possible for a subject S if S has access to 
both the material and conceptual means to accomplish it.5 
                                                
5 The phrase “possible for” makes my notion of technological possiblity subject-relative (see Gibbs [1970] for an 
analysis of “possible for”). We sometimes speak of technological possibilities in a more abstract sense. For example, 
there is a sense in which it is technologically possible (for some unspecified someone) to travel to the moon. I have no 
principled objection to this usage, but in the present paper I am concerned with cases in which S is specified—and 
locked to a particular time, space, and circumstance.  
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The possibility of my spanning a river with an iron bridge turns on both what the world is like (i.e., that iron is available 
to me and has certain properties, and that I have certain capabilities with respect to iron) and how my concepts fit 
together (i.e., that I think iron has certain properties that I can put to use in making trusses). Without the material means, 
the bridge would fail. Without the conceptual means, I would never attempt it. Given this definition, the connection 
between technological possibility and practicability is clear: a subject’s technological tools are a determinant of what is 
practicable. An action is only practicable if it is technologically possible. 
There are two ways to rule something technologically impossible for a given subject: either the subject doesn’t have 
access to the material means of accomplishing it, or the subject doesn’t have access to the conceptual means of 
accomplishing it. The burden in assessing whether a course of action is technologically possible is in making a sensible 
determination as to which conceptual and material means should be considered ‘accessible’ to a subject given the 
peculiarities of her situation. A course of action that would exhaust a subject’s material resources, tax her creative 
faculties, and take a long time to construct would be difficult, but nevertheless accessible. Note that in the case of 
complex investigations like scientific experiments, the most challenging aspect of completing an inquiry is often in 
determining whether the equipment has functioned properly, whether the desired intervention actually occurred, or 
whether a particular inference is actually warranted by the data. All of these tasks should be included in the calculus of 
the technological possibility of the inquiry as a whole. In the following, I will consider how to draw the line between 
accessible and inaccessible material and conceptual means. 
Let me begin with material means. I said above that the possibility of my spanning a river with an iron bridge depends on 
my having access to iron, iron having certain properties, and my having certain capabilities. This suggests a way to 
divide material means into three further considerations. The first, access to the material itself, is simply a logistical 
consideration that depends on a subject’s situation—roughly, what a subject has, or can beg, borrow, or steal. The other 
two, the properties of that material and the subject’s capabilities, ultimately rest on physical possibility. 
(h) A state of affairs is physically possible if it is not precluded by the laws of nature. 
Physical possibility is about the world, not our ideas of it; that is, physical possibility is not subject relative. Physical 
possibility is about what is possible given the actual laws of nature, not our account of those laws. This means, for 
example, that fusion experiments have been physically possible for billions of years (light from stars billions of light 
years away substantiates this). By contrast, technological possibility is about what is possible for a particular person (or 
group of persons) in a particular context: it takes a technological advance like the construction of the Tokomak fusion 
reactors in the 1950s and 60s for scientists to perform fusion experiments. Physical possibility is a hard constraint on 
technological possibility because technologies cannot subvert the laws of nature, and neither can users of technology. 
That is, my ability to build an iron bridge depends on the physical possibility of iron taking the form of a bridge and on 
the physical possibility of my body (and other available technology) giving it that form. Physical possibility is a 
necessary condition for technological possibility, but physical possibility is not sufficient for technological possibility. 
There are many actions that are physically possible and yet beyond the means of a particular subject to bring about, even 
if the subject has access to the requisite material. 
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Let me be clear about the relationship between physical possibility and a subject’s capabilities. I have just claimed that a 
subject’s capabilities are ‘ultimately limited’ by physical possibility, where physical possibility is to be understood in 
terms of the laws of nature. This means that physical possibility is sensitive to physiological limits in addition to 
mechanical ones. To give a concrete example, suppose that my physiology is such that I cannot leap tall buildings in a 
single bound (unaided), but I can easily jump a hurdle. But what about edge cases? Suppose that I cannot presently dunk 
a basketball, but that with enough conditioning, I could. Then, strictly speaking, dunking is an accessible course of action 
for me. However, if I am presently considering whether to dunk this basketball or just lay it in, then I had better lay it in, 
because my time-sensitive context does not afford the months of training and conditioning necessary for me to dunk 
today. Evaluating technological possibility requires specifying a context more or less precisely, and this situated analysis 
is often helpful in identifying the relevant limiting factors, which may include time, money, material, equipment, or 
skills. 
The second basic component of technological possibility is a subject’s access to conceptual means. Here, the relevant 
hard limit is epistemic possibility.6 Anything that is epistemically impossible for subject S is also, necessarily, 
technologically impossible for her. In other words, considerations of epistemic possibility allow us to deem 
technologically impossible those courses of action that a subject knows she cannot accomplish. In cases in which a 
subject’s reasons for ruling out a course of action have to do with physical considerations, as in the basketball example 
above, this seems redundant. But in other cases, a subject may know that a course of action costs too much or is 
unethical or is simply beyond her cognitive means. In such cases, a subject can rule out the course of action on the basis 
of its epistemic impossibility. We can also rule out those courses a subject has a responsibility to determine that she 
cannot accomplish. These courses of action are precisely the ones that are conceptually unavailable.  
There are two ways for a subject to be mistaken about availability. Either she thinks a course of action is not available 
when it is or she thinks it is available when it is not. For example, there may well be courses of action that, because of 
mistaken beliefs, seem conceptually unavailable. While a subject would probably not attempt a course of action that she 
thinks is unavailable, it is nonetheless the case that such a task is technologically possible for her if what ruled it out was 
a mistaken belief. Indeed, only those tasks that she knows to be unavailable (or is required to find out are unavailable) are 
genuine technological impossibilities. The converse mistake is for a subject to fail to fulfill a responsibility to find out 
that a course of action is impossible. In such a case, a subject may believe a course of action is available to her, when in 
fact she should have (for example) made some investigation that would have eliminated that candidate action. For 
example, before embarking on a laboratory experiment, a scientist might be expected to perform a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation to ensure that the experiment could have the expected result. If she fails to do the calculation (or gets the 
wrong answer), she might attempt the experiment. But this does not change the fact that it is technologically impossible 
for her, and it does not change the fact that she should have known it was technologically impossible (because it was 
epistemically impossible). 
                                                
6 I owe a considerable debt to an anonymous reviewer for urging me to reconsider an earlier, wrongheaded approach to 
analyzing conceptual means. 
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Epistemic possibility is a necessary condition for technological possibility, but not a sufficient condition for it. That is, 
just because an action is epistemically possible doesn’t make it technologically possible. Physically impossible actions 
that I do not know are impossible are epistemically possible, but not technologically possible. In other words, physical 
and epistemic possiblity are both necessary conditions for technological possibility. 
Let me now address four potential concerns about the role epistemic possibility plays in determining technological 
possibility. First, I concluded the earlier part of the paper with the claim that technological possibility is an enabling 
condition for epistemic possibility. Now I have proposed that epistemic possibility is an enabling condition for 
technological possibility. This raises the spectre of circularity.7 Second, “available conceptual means” depends in large 
part on the conceptual analysis a subject performs. It might not seem like epistemic possibility is the concept to capture 
this. Third, we might be concerned about the role community standards play in specifying responsibilities. For example, 
if a subject moves between epistemic communities with different expectations, a course of action may switch, seemingly 
willy-nilly, between being technologically possible and impossible. Finally, it might be objected that epistemic 
possibility doesn’t correctly capture what it means for the conceptual means for a course of action to be “available.” 
The first potential concern results from a conflation of the epistemic possibilities regarding the completion of a task and 
those based on the completion of a task. For example, “it is possible to reveal surface details of the moon through 
telescopic investigation” is a quite different epistemic possibility than “it is possible that the moon’s surface is smooth.” 
The line between epistemically possible and impossible claims about the geology of the moon has the potential to shift 
with the advent of any number of technological advances, including the telescope and space travel. The claim that “the 
moon’s surface is smooth” was epistemically possible (and indeed widely believed) before Galileo’s telescopic 
investigations showed surface features. Galileo’s instrument provided new evidence that could make a difference in 
determining what propositions about the moon’s surface were epistemically possible for various subjects, and in addition 
the use of the telescope was available as a candidate responsibility for some subjects who wanted to make claims about 
the surface of the moon. (Exactly who was responsible for what depended in part upon the expectations of the relevant 
community.) In short, however, the epistemic possiblity that “telescopes can reveal distant features” enables the 
technological possibility of viewing lunar surface details through a telescope, which in turn makes the claim that “the 
surface of the moon is smooth” epistemically impossible. To put the point more generally, an epistemic possibility 
regarding the completion of a task enables a subject to pursue it, while the line between epistemic possibilities and 
impossibilities can shift based on the completion of that task. 
The second worry inquires into the relationship between epistemic possibility and conceptual analysis. For example, in 
the telescope example just described, I noted that the epistemic possibility of using a telescope to investigate the surface 
features of the moon has to do with “supposed properties” of glass and brass. Conceptual analysis means determining the 
compossibility of a proposed state of affairs with a particular background context. This may seem orthogonal to 
epistemic possibility. But as Hacking says, we bring logic into the fold when the “terms of individuation” produce a 
                                                
7 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this concern to my attention. 
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contradiction (1975, 333), and this allows us to rule out contradictory situations on the grounds that they are 
epistemically impossible. Let me be clear about how this works. Whether a conceptual incompatibility exists can change 
depending on the level of detail we give to the terms we use to pick out a situation. In considering whether I could leap 
tall buildings, I might at first neglect to take into account some relevant details, such as what I know of the laws of 
physics, and on the basis of that incomplete picture judge the deed possible. But if I carried on filling in details, says 
Hartshorne, I would wind up in perfect agreement with physical possibility—in the end, the two are indistinguishable 
(see Hartshorne 1963, 595). This contention is mistaken for two reasons. First, it makes an unwarranted demand on 
epistemic responsibilities, and second, it conflates physical possibility with scientific theories. 
To better illustrate Hartshorne’s contention, we can draw on George Seddon’s example of how the relevant analysis 
should work. An iron bar that floats on water has been supposed by some philosophers to be conceivable,8 but physically 
impossible. (“Bar,” clarifies Seddon, is meant to rule out needles, which float on surface tension, and the Queen Mary, 
which floats on “Zurich capital” [1972, 483].) Since it is physically impossible for an iron bar to float on water, filling in 
our concepts with more information about what it is to be water and what it is to be iron and what it is to float will lead 
to just the sort of self-contradiction that would allow it to be ruled epistemically impossible on conceptual grounds. But 
for someone ignorant of the latest scientific theories and without practical experience with the relevant materials, there is 
no such additional information to fill in the concepts. It may well be conceivable to her for an iron bar to float on water 
because there is nothing inconsistent in the concepts she has. Assuming she has no epistemic duties requiring her to 
investigate further, floating iron bars are epistemically possible for such a subject. On the other hand, for anyone with 
relevant common experience or a passing acquaintance with our best scientific theories, it is conceptually impossible for 
iron to float on water. Furthermore, iron floating on water would be epistemically impossible for anyone with a 
countervailing epistemic duty. 
The third potential anxiety about the role of epistemic possibility in technological possibility is that differing community 
standards would seem to make courses of action switch haphazardly between being epistemically possible and 
impossible, and therefore between being technologically possible and impossible. According to my account, different 
community expectations can result in the same action being technologically possible in by one community’s standard 
and impossible by another’s. But the difference is not haphazard. One community may require that a subject take action 
that would rule a course of action epistemically impossible (and therefore technologically impossible as well), while 
another community has no such requirement. The concern is that the specified course of action would actually be 
impossible for the subject to carry out in either case, and my definition of technological possibility doesn’t correctly 
reflect this because it gives different answers for the two communities. But remember, the argument isn’t that a subject 
can actually accomplish every technologically possible course of action. It’s that a subject cannot accomplish any course 
of action that is technologically impossible. 
                                                
8 Seddon actually discusses logical possibility, so I have made some minor adjustments. 
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The fourth concern is related to the third, but is more general. It might be objected that epistemic possibility doesn’t 
correctly capture what it means for the conceptual means for a course of action to be “available.” At the outset of the 
discussion of access to conceptual means, I stated that one of the ways to be mistaken about availability is to mistakenly 
consider a course of action available when it is not. Similarly, there may be cases in which a subject does not know that a 
course of action is unavailable, nor will she have a responsibility to rule it out. In such a case, the course of action will be 
epistemically possible for S (even if she doesn’t explicitly think the course of action is available). If such a course of 
action is also physically possible, then it will be technologically possible, even though it could never actually be 
accomplished. This seems to suggest that epistemic possibility is the wrong measure to determine whether a conceptual 
means is available. If so, it would appear that we are left with three alternatives (besides starting over). First, we could 
deny that cases like the one I just constructed actually exist. But I have no sturdy basis for making such an argument.9 
Second, we could try to shore up technological possibility by adding some additional condition, but I have no 
suggestions as to what that condition should look like. Third (and this is the option I prefer), we can accept that physical 
possibility and epistemic possibility are not quite jointly sufficient for technological possibility after all. Even so, 
technological possibility is a useful and principled means of drawing a hard line between practicable and impracticable 
actions, because it is still a necessary condition on practicability. Put another way, my account admits as technologically 
possible some courses of action that we might wish it deemed impossible. But it deems no course of action impossible 
that we should wish it to deem possible. 
*	   *	   *	  
I began this paper by considering conflicting claims about what difference technology makes in the practice of science. 
My diagnosis is that such conflicts can be understood by analyzing differences in implicit assumptions about possibility. 
That is, we should understand the conflict between Galison and Agar as stemming from imprecise expressions of what 
was possible. Peter Galison observes that “some kind of numerical modelling was necessary [for completing fission 
bomb work], and here nothing could replace the prototype computer just coming into operation in late 1945: the ENIAC” 
(Galison 1996, 122), while John Agar argues that “computerization was usually first proposed when the existing 
practices and technologies were still capable of the computational task at hand” (Agar 2006, 873). 
Let’s put these claims into the language of epistemic and technological possibility. According to Galison and Agar, 
Manhattan Project scientists considered three approaches to the problem: they could perform fission experiments to learn 
crucial facts, they could solve difficult analytic equations, or they could perform a brute-force numerical attack on the 
bomb equations. Any of these three approaches could satisfy their epistemic responsibilities.10 The question was whether 
                                                
9 It might be objected that what makes a conceptual means “too complex” to be conceivable necessarily has to do with 
brain structures, and therefore could be ruled out on grounds of physical impossibility. But this is merely a plausible 
retort, not a definitive one. 
10 The third approach, numerical attack, particularly when it took the form of Monte Carlo calculation, required some 
advocacy before it was considered acceptable throughout the scientific community, but it was almost immediately 
accepted within the Manhattan Project itself, perhaps in part because of enduring frustrations with the other two 
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they were practicable, and this was a matter of some debate. Fission experiments were considered impracticable given 
the particular time constraints, economic pressures, and allowable risks associated with the Manhattan Project. Dozens of 
the world’s best mathematical minds were basically stumped by the intractable analytic equations, so that approach also 
appeared impracticable (whether it was or not). And finally, it was not at all clear that there was time enough to run a 
numerical brute force attack on the bomb equations. What is now clear is that, before the digital electronic computer, 
numerical analysis had not been successful, but with the computer, such methods were successful. The question is 
whether it was the computer that made the difference. 
Could Monte Carlo calculations have been performed using existing computational methods? A human computer could 
follow any of the instructions ENIAC performs, and the Manhattan Project employed many such computers. But a 
human would do the job much more slowly, so there is some question as to whether the calculations could be completed 
within the required time constraints. Early computer literature is full of direct comparisons between human and digital 
electronic computers. A typical example is that ENIAC could perform a particular calculation in 60 milliseconds (or 30 
seconds if the result was to be printed out). It would take an individual human computer 7 hours to solve the same 
problem (von Neumann 1961, 9). ENIAC did not make the individual calculations physically possible—they always 
were physically possible. Nor did ENIAC make the calculations epistemically possible—scientists had quite specific 
calculation methods in mind well before ENIAC came along (indeed, the bulk of Agar’s account goes to substantiate this 
claim: the Monte Carlo method was known to mathematicians decades before the first computer was constructed). What 
ENIAC provided was faster calculation—by many orders of magnitude as compared to individual human computers, and 
by smaller orders as compared to other existing computational methods. 
Before ENIAC, “a single hydrodynamics problem in an implosion simulation required passing a deck of punched cards 
through a dozen machines,” a process requiring a full month, even after Richard Feynman and his computing group cut 
the process by two thirds by devising a parallel computing method, and even with the machines running 24 hours a day 
(Seidel 1998, 34). By contrast, von Neumann estimated that “one criticality problem requires following 100 primary 
neutrons through 100 collisions (of the primary neutron or its descendants) per primary neutron,” which, computed using 
the Monte Carlo method on ENIAC, “should take about 5 hours” (Richtmyer and von Neumann 1947, 752). These aren’t 
identical calculations, but the examples give a sense of the dramatic change in speed offered by the Monte Carlo method 
on the ENIAC as compared with prior computational approaches. 
It is on this significant difference in speed that the debate finally turns. For Galison to be right, we must accept that 
ENIAC’s faster computations moved this particular application of the Monte Carlo method from the “too slow to 
consider” category into the “can't rule it out” column. For Agar to be right, we must accept that scientists could have 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
approaches—an interesting story in its own right, but beyond the scope of the present paper. Galison (1996) is a good 
starting point for that story. 
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implemented this application of Monte Carlo using older methods of calculation. This remains a matter of debate, but it 
is a much more precise debate than the one we started with. I tend to side with Galison in this particular case, because if 
Manhattan Project scientists had considered implementing Monte Carlo using traditional methods, their back-of-
envelope estimations would not (in my estimation) have suggested any advantage over their current approaches. It is 
only with the considerable improvement in speed that came with ENIAC that the problem could be solved in practical 
time. It is worth noting that if the computational problem were even larger—say, fusion bombs rather than fission—the 
case would be even stronger. 
It is also worth noting that once the method was suggested to him by Ulam, von Neumann immediately thought to 
implement it using ENIAC (see Richtmyer and von Neumann 1947, 751-52). Perhaps this is a case of the “Birmingham 
screwdriver”—with a hammer in hand, everything looks like a nail. And when faster computers are available, more 
problems begin to look susceptible to a numerical approach. But this is to suggest a psychological mechanism by which 
the scientists became cognizant of the fact that Monte Carlo was a promising approach—it is not to say that Monte Carlo 
was inconceivable (or unconceived of) before the computer. It is clear that scientists had the conceptual resources 
necessary before the advent of the digital electronic computer—no matter what role the computer might have had in 
reminding them of this possible solution. 
* * * 
I began this paper by considering conflicting claims about what difference technological change makes to the pursuit of 
knowledge. My diagnosis was that the conflict is due to differences in implicit assumptions about possibility. In the first 
part, I argued for the inclusion of practicable responsibilities in the analysis of epistemic possibility. In the second part, I 
introduced technological possibility, which depends on access to the material and conceptual means of bringing about a 
desired state of affairs, as one constraint on practicability, making technological possibility a necessary but insufficient 
condition for epistemic possibility. 
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